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Abstract
Background Claims of positive psychology about people
with cancer enjoy great popularity because they seem to
offer scientific confirmation of strongly held cultural beliefs
and values.
Purpose Our goal is to examine critically four widely
accepted claims in the positive psychology literature
regarding adaptational outcomes among individuals living
with cancer.
Methods We examine: (1) the role of positive factors, such
as a “fighting spirit” in extending the life of persons with
cancer; (2) effects of interventions cultivating positive
psychological states on immune functioning and cancer
progression and mortality; and evidence concerning (3)
benefit finding and (4) post-traumatic growth following
serious illness such as cancer and other highly threatening
experiences.
Results Claims about these areas of research routinely
made in the positive psychology literature do not fit with
available evidence. We note in particular the incoherence of
claims about the adaptational value of benefit finding and
post-traumatic growth among cancer patients, and the
implausibility of claims that interventions that enhance
benefit finding improve the prognosis of cancer patients by
strengthening the immune system.
Conclusion We urge positive psychologists to rededicate
themselves to a positive psychology based on scientific
evidence rather than wishful thinking.
Keywords Positive psychology . Cancer . Immune
functioning . Benefit finding . Post-traumatic growth
Introduction
In his foreword to the second edition of the Handbook of
Positive Psychology, Peterson [1] warned of “the tempta-
tion for those of us associated with this new field to run
ahead of what we know” (p. xxiii). He reminds us that
“[p]ositive psychology is psychology—psychology is
science—and science requires checking theories against
evidence.... Positive psychology will rise or fall on the
science on which it is based (p. xxiii).” From its inception,
positive psychology has insisted that what distinguishes it
from previous positive psychologies (there have been
several) is its “cumulative empirical base” ([2], p.7) and
its “reliance on empirical research” ([3], p.252). In this
article, we examine four areas of positive psychology
critically relevant to readers of Annals— (1) the role of
positive factors, particularly a “fighting spirit” in slowing
the progression of cancer and extending the life of persons
diagnosed with cancer [4, 5]; (2) the effects of interventions
cultivating positive psychological states on immune func-
tioning and cancer progression and mortality; (3) benefit
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finding in the face of health threats; and (4) post-traumatic
growth following serious illness and other highly threaten-
ing experiences. We have chosen these areas because they
represent the most distinctive and provocative claims of
positive psychology about cancer and because they enjoy
considerable popularity, resonating as they do so well with
cultural beliefs and media accounts of the psychology of
cancer. Yet, we will argue that, in making these claims,
positive psychology researchers have run well ahead and
even counter to what we know, have failed to check theory
against evidence, and have been seemingly oblivious to the
cumulative empirical base of the broader psychological and
cancer literatures. In doing so, they have failed to live up to
the pronouncements of the field’s spokespeople while
promulgating bad science.
In offering this critique, we are not implying that all of
positive psychology is flawed or that focusing on human
strengths is inherently unscientific. Recent theoretical and
empirical contributions revealing the role of positive affect
in human adaptation [6] and evidence demonstrating
people’s previously unrealized resilience in the aftermath
of adversity [7, 8] demonstrate the potential benefits that
can accrue from applying the best of psychological science
to the study of positive aspects of people’s lives. Nonethe-
less, the areas of inquiry we discuss in this article, which
have drawn tremendous attention from within behavioral
medicine, the broader psychological community, and the
popular press, are scientifically flawed. In their enthusiasm
to advance positive psychology, its advocates have created
an enormous gap between their assertions and scientific
evidence. We now turn to the first of these flawed areas of
inquiry, positive psychology’s perspective on attitude and
emotion influencing survival after diagnosis of cancer.
Positive psychology articulates a role for hope, wisdom,
courage, spirituality, responsibility, and perseverance in
human adaptation in sharp contrast, proponents claim, to
the negative biases of a conventional psychology that is too
focused on distress and psychopathology to the exclusion
of positive experiences [2]. A positive psychology of
cancer challenges the conventional emphasis on the trauma
and long-term negative psychological consequences of a
dread, devastating disease [9] with the view that many,
perhaps most persons diagnosed with cancer find benefits
and positive meaning in the experience and even grow
psychologically [10].
But a positive psychology of cancer further asserts that
the progression and outcome of cancer can be influenced by
an attitude of fighting spirit, positive coping including
acceptance and positive expression of feelings, optimism,
and social support [4]. In an important sense, extension to
cancer bolsters the credibility of the larger paradigm of
positive psychology by broadening claims that it can
provide an empirical basis for living a better richer life to
it being able to provide a basis for extending life after a
diagnosis of cancer. A positive psychology perspective on
cancer also is quite consonant with entrenched cultural
beliefs and media portrayals of cancer as a life-threatening
disease that can be defeated by character strength, persistent
effort, and maintenance of a positive attitude, and it
seemingly provides a scientific basis for these beliefs.
Fighting Spirit and Other Positive Factors in Cancer
Incidence, Survival Time, and Mortality
The idea that by adopting a fighting spirit, cancer patients
improve their chances for survival predates its endorsement
by positive psychology. Yet, if true, the idea epitomizes the
triumph of character and attitude over biology that is so key
to a positive psychology of cancer. Fighting spirit is
characterized by patients optimistically viewing cancer as
a challenge and having a determination to fight the cancer
and not to allow it to disrupt their lives. It was first
conceptualized as an attitude toward cancer, but later as a
positive coping style. An early study [11] was widely
interpreted as demonstrating that patients having a fighting
spirit were more likely to be disease-free and to survive to 5
and 10 years post-assessment. However, these claims were
based on a small investigation that used a brief open-ended
question assessment in a sample of 57 early-stage breast
cancer patients and which lacked statistical control for node
status. A later, larger study (n=578) that used a self-report
measure failed to find a prognostic value for fighting spirit
[12]. The investigators expressed relief: “Our findings
suggest that women can be relieved of the burden of guilt
that occurs when they find it difficult to maintain a fighting
spirit” ([12], p.1335).
A systematic review [13] of effects of coping on cancer
identified 12 studies examining the prognostic value of
fighting spirit for cancer progression and survival, with
most of them having negative findings. The larger studies
were uniformly negative, with the two positive studies
being smaller and methodologically flawed and with
inadequate statistical control of biomedical and treatment
confounds. Overall, Petticrew et al. [13] found little
evidence of the influence of psychological factors on
cancer progression and survival, leading the authors to
conclude: “People with cancer should not feel pressured
into adopting particular coping styles to improve survival or
reduce the risk of recurrence” (p. 1066). Since the Petticrew
et al. review, a 10-year follow-up of the Watson et al. [12]
study findings again found that fighting spirit conferred no
advantage for survival [14], consistent with another large
study of women with early-stage breast cancer [15].
Claims about the physical health benefits of having a
fighting spirit persist in the literature concerning a positive
ann. behav. med. (2010) 39:16–26 17
psychology of cancer [14], but most commentators without
such an allegiance agree that the accumulation of studies
have demonstrated the fighting spirit lacks value as a
prognostic factor in cancer, much less as a causal factor.
Yet, there is still little appreciation of how unrealistic the
idea of being able to demonstrate such an effect was from
the beginning. As Watson et al. [12] noted, their study of
559 early breast cancer patients generated so few cases of
progression and death in 5 years that, in order for a valid
effect of fighting spirit to be demonstrated, adopting such
an attitude would have had to be more potent than adjuvant
therapy. For a valid effect to have been demonstrated in
Greer et al.’s [11] more modest sample of 57 women with
early breast cancer, effects of a fighting spirit would have to
be even much stronger than most known biological factors
or treatments.
On an a priori basis, one might assume that it should be
easy to demonstrate that positive psychological character-
istics predict subsequent physical health, but upon reflec-
tion, it is also clear that it might be difficult to establish a
causal connection. People possessing material and social
resources are more likely to report positive psychological
states, and having these external resources can be related
directly to better subsequent health, with any association
observed between positive psychological states and health
potentially being spurious. Similarly, people in better health
may report better positive psychological states and better
initial health predicts better later health. They report better
psychological states because they feel better physically and
because they may also possess other information about their
health status, as when cancer patients are informed of the
treatment they will receive and their prognosis. Thus, in
attempting to demonstrate that positive psychological
characteristics cause better health, it is important that
baseline differences in resources and biomedical and
treatment variables be specified, adequately assessed, and
statistically controlled. Otherwise, there is the likelihood
that positive psychological states will only appear to predict
subsequent health because of residual confounding, i.e., the
failure of statistical controls. Of course, demonstration that
direct manipulation of psychological states produces
changes in health would be persuasive, but there are few
such demonstrations, and so, we must more typically rely
on statistical manipulation of what are essentially observa-
tional correlational data.
An analogy can be made with studies examining self-
perceived health (SPH) or physical health quality of life
(PHQoL) as predictors of subsequent health. Even with
statistical control of available disease and treatment
variables, these self-reports very often remain significant
predictors of mortality among chronically ill populations
[16]. This is because available control variables do not
completely capture disease severity, treatment intensity, or
medical history. For instance, pretreatment clinical tumor
staging is often used to control for severity of disease, but
provides an incomplete summary of overall disease burden.
Thus, introducing stage as a control variable typically
leaves considerable residual variance in disease severity
unexplained.
Variables such as SPH or PHQoL are confounded with
disease and treatment variables, particularly when patient
perceptions are informed by medical opinion or awareness
of the extent of illness, allowing these self-reports to
account for residual variance in mortality. Yet, no one
would advocate attempting to influence patient self-report,
independent of medical treatment in order to improve
survival because these variables are not in themselves
causal—confounding with variance resulting from incom-
plete control is what provides the prognostic value of SPH
and PHQoL. Extending this analogy to positive psycholog-
ical states, some relationship to mortality through health
and behavior history or current disease and treatment status
is to be expected and does not necessarily indicate anything
theoretically interesting or clinically useful. Pressman and
Cohen [17] make similar arguments in expressing “serious
conceptual and methodological reservations” (p. 960) about
the literature relating positive affect to physical health.
Claims are nonetheless widespread that positive psycho-
logical factors slow progression, increase survival time, and
reduce mortality in cancer. However, Chida and Steptoe’s
[18] systematic review of positive psychological factors and
survival identified 35 studies of mortality in samples of
patients having particular chronic illnesses. Their meta-
analysis then examined 19 studies of which five were
cardiovascular disease and six were cancer, and null results
were obtained for both conditions. Yet, in seeming contrast,
Chida, Hamer, Wardle, and Steptoe [19] investigated the
contribution of positive (i.e., fighting spirit and social
support), ambiguous (locus of control and extroversion),
and negative (stressful life events and negative coping
style) stress-related factors to cancer incidence and mortal-
ity. They indicated in their abstract that they had found
highly statistically significant associations for incidence of
cancer in initially healthy populations, (p=0.005), shorter
survival time for persons diagnosed with cancer (p<0.001),
and higher rates of cancer mortality (p<0.001). Chida et al.
qualified their conclusion, providing statistical evidence of
a publication bias, and so, these results should be
interpreted with caution.
Nonetheless, these claims warrant scrutiny because they
are provocative, fuel existing beliefs that psychological
variables influence progression and outcome of cancer, and
are already being cited uncritically as the justification for
preventive and therapeutic intervention [20, 21]. These
meta-analyses aggregate a considerable number studies,
70% of which individually yielded null findings. The meta-
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analysis for incidence of cancer involved integrating 142
studies with an average sample size of 87,062; for survival
time, the integration of 157 studies with an average sample
size of 418; and for cancer mortality, the integration of 50
studies with an average size of 93,059. With such huge
aggregate samples, levels of statistical significance are
much less informative than hazard ratios (HRs) and
confidence intervals (CIs). For cancer incidence, the results
were HR=1.06 (CI=1.02–1.11); for survival, HR=1.03
(CI=1.02–1.04); and for mortality, 1.29 (CI=1.16–1.44).
The CIs for incidence and survival barely exceed the 1.0
that would have rendered them nonsignificant. Certainly,
finding such an HR would not typically generate much
excitement in the larger epidemiological literature. Recall
too that Chida et al. acknowledge finding statistical
indications of a publication bias, i.e., that would be “likely
to create a positive result bias if authors are more likely to
submit, or editors to accept positive rather than positive
than negative or inconclusive results” (p. 473). A positive
publication bias could easily explain such modest effects,
especially those for incidence and survival.
Yet, further scrutiny casts even greater doubt upon the
validity of Chida et al.’s [19] conclusions, in part because
of decisions made in integrating these studies in meta-
analyses and in part because of the poor quality of many of
the studies on which the meta-analyses draw. Chida et al.’s
meta-analyses were conducted incorrectly because they
counted a number of samples multiple times, effectively
treating each as an independent cohort, rather than more
appropriately entering one effect size per cohort [22, 23].
Thus, one study of the effects of the stressor death of a
child on cancer mortality [24] was counted eight times
because two ways of dying, accidental or in war, and four
different cancer sites were examined. Another study [25,
26] was counted 22 times because the effects of death of a
spouse and death of a child were each considered for
different cancer sites. The “stress-related variables” that
were considered equivalent for the purposes of meta-
analysis (such as fighting spirit, shift work, death of child,
neuroticism, and the MMPI Lie scale) were so highly
heterogeneous as to defy any integrative theoretical
interpretation of the omnibus effect size produced by a
meta-analysis. Few of these studies provided even minimal
statistical control over potential medical confounds: only
28% of the incidence studies, 1% of the survival studies,
and 40% of the mortality studies. Many of the outlier
highest estimates of an association between a stress-related
variable and cancer came from underpowered studies with
inadequate statistical control.
Chida et al.’s [19] analyses were seriously flawed, but
the methodologically limited and highly heterogeneous set
of studies on which their analyses drew would pose
challenges to making any integrative summary statement.
Moreover, consistent with Pressman and Cohen [17], the
problems that our cursory review of the problems in the
available studies that Chida et al. encountered do not
bode well for making any substantive interpretation of
the literature relating psychological variables to cancer
outcomes.
Recently, there were hopes that newly emerging data
from the large Women’s Health Initiative might shed light
on the role of positive and negative factors in incidence of
breast cancer. Michael et al. [27] followed a sample of
84,334 women for an average of 7.6 years during which
2,481 invasive breast cancers were diagnosed. The unan-
ticipated results were that, in this sample, low social
support and high life stress seemed to protect against the
development of breast cancer.
Benefit Finding: A Case Study of Running Ahead
of What We Know
Peterson’s [1] warning to positive psychology investigators
and practitioners to resist the temptation to run ahead of
what is known could not come soon enough for the study of
benefit finding in adversity. After decades of study, we still
do not know what benefit finding is, nor do we understand
the circumstances in which finding benefits has positive
adaptational value. Yet, positive psychology investigators
have begun to identify interventions enhancing benefit
finding among seriously ill individuals. Although we
appreciate the temptation, the scientific literature demands
restraint. More than restraint, it demands that the leadership
of positive psychology offer a more sober—and scientifically
accurate—tone on their websites, in press releases, when
discussing research in their seminars, at their international
summits, and in their writings. People living with a variety of
illnesses, injuries, and losses have reported to positive
psychology investigators that despite their plight, they have
discovered benefits in their situation. People being treated for
cancer, myocardial infarction and heart disease, HIV/AIDS,
multiple sclerosis, limb amputation, acquired brain injury,
rheumatoid arthritis, and lupus find benefits associated with
their illness. Individuals who are bereaved, victims of
terror incidents, survivors of childhood sexual abuse,
victims of violence and trauma victims of natural
disasters, and parents who have lost a child to illness or
violent death have described to investigators benefits
gained from their adverse experience [28]. In hundreds
of published studies, the majority of seriously ill or
victimized individuals have reported benefit or gain. As
Lechner et al. [28] note, although the study of benefit
finding in adversity predates positive psychology, interest
in this line of inquiry has been fueled by positive
psychology’s emphasis on thriving and human strengths,
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and it has become customary for authors of benefit finding
studies to offer positive psychology as a context for their
work.
We Still Do Not Understand Benefit Finding
Tennen and Affleck [29] urged positive psychology
investigators not to get ahead of themselves by designing
benefit finding interventions and instead focus on gaining
a solid conceptual understanding of the phenomenon,
creating fundamentally sound measures, and using elegant
prospective study designs. Seven years later, Lechner,
Tennen, and Affleck [28] lamented that not much had
changed. Positive psychology has offered little in terms of
providing a commonly agreed upon conceptual home for
benefit finding, measurement remains crude, and prospec-
tive study designs are not to be found. Thus, we still know
little about a phenomenon that has attracted more than 300
publications.
Theorists originally viewed victims’ reports of benefits
or gains as a positive illusory process [30]. Over the years,
this view has been supplemented by the possibility that
benefit finding is a selective appraisal; that it is a coping
strategy; and that it reflects a genuine positive change that
results from facing adversity. We will have more to say
about positive psychology’s study of genuine change in our
discussion of post-traumatic growth.
After concluding that benefit finding has not been
examined in the psychological literature in a way that
allows us to conclude that it is a selective evaluation or a
coping strategy, Tennen and Affleck [29] entertained
several alternative views. They considered the possibility
that benefit finding represented a personality characteristic,
since some individuals characteristically provide narratives
in which misfortune or life tragedy contains a positive
aspect or leads to a positive outcome [31]. They also
considered the possibility that benefit finding represents a
way in which people explain their characteristic hedonic
level [32]. A third explanation considered was based on
Ross’s [33] demonstration that an exaggeration of positive
change will occur when a person’s theory of change leads
him/her to anticipate such change when little or no change
has actually occurred. Finally, Tennen and Affleck [29]
considered the possibility that benefit finding may represent
a downward temporal comparison [34]. In view of these
compelling alternative conceptualizations of benefit find-
ing, Tennen and Affleck [29] urged positive psychology
investigators to focus on evaluating the alternatives before
rushing to create benefit finding interventions. Seven years
later, we are no closer to understanding what benefit finding
is about.
Is Benefit Finding Associated with Positive Adaptational
Outcomes?
Besides not knowing what benefit finding is, positive
psychologists have been unable to determine the circum-
stances in which it is linked to positive or negative
outcomes. Indeed, recent reviews reveal major inconsisten-
cies across studies in the association between benefit
finding and adjustment indicators. In their review of the
literature examining benefit finding among individuals
living with cancer, Stanton, Bower, and Low [35] found
that although some studies have linked benefit finding with
lower levels of distress, greater life satisfaction, and other
positive adjustment indices, other studies have found no
relationship between benefit finding and adjustment out-
comes or even a negative relationship. Similarly, Zoellner
and Maercker [36] concluded that the literature “reveals a
rather irritating and inconclusive picture” (p. 635) of the
adaptive significance of benefit finding. More recently,
Sumalla, Ochoa, and Blanco [37] drew a similar conclusion
from their review of the literature on post-traumatic growth
in cancer. Among the explanations offered for this
inconsistent pattern of associations are that there exists a
non-linear relationship between benefit finding and adjust-
ment [38], that unmeasured moderators may be at work
[39], and that benefit finding has a constructive side and a
self-deceptive and potentially dysfunctional side [36].
Positive psychology is a very long way from understanding
benefit finding and its correlates. Without this understand-
ing, positive psychologists can best demonstrate their
allegiance to a scientific attitude by changing course and
acknowledging just how little is actually known.
Can Enhancing Benefit Finding Improve Immune
Functioning and the Survival of Cancer Patients?
McGregor and colleagues [39] identified a study of group
cognitive–behavioral stress management (CBSM; 40) as the
first to demonstrate that psychological intervention could
change benefit finding in cancer patients. Presenting results
of a smaller sub-study with the same sample, these
investigators reported that changes in benefit finding
brought about by CBSM were correlated with changes in
immune measures, independent of changes in distress
[39]. Similarly, Carver, Lechner, and Antoni [41] inter-
preted the effect of Spiegel and colleagues’ supportive
expressive therapy [42–44] as possibly occurring through
increasing benefit finding through emotional expression,
although Spiegel et al. [42] did not actually measure benefit
finding.
These are extraordinary interpretations, particularly in
view of the long-standing belief of scientists and laypeople
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alike that Spiegel et al. [42] had demonstrated a strong
effect of psychological intervention on survival that was not
anticipated and that was not readily explained theoretically.
Such interpretations are also strongly consonant with lay
beliefs in the benefits of improving immune functioning as
a way of fighting cancer [45]. Many breast cancer patients
come to support groups and group therapy with the explicit
expectation that they are improving their chances for
slowed progression and longer survival [46]. Moreover,
another investigator group [47] has recently claimed also to
have demonstrated changes in the immune system, slowed
progression of cancer, and extended survival through
psychological intervention. The intervention employed in
this study was complex but emphasized stress reduction and
relaxation. It was thus quite similar to the CBSM construed
by McGregor et al. [39] as an intervention improving
benefit finding.
As McGregor et al. [39] acknowledge, CBSM was not
designed to enhance benefit finding, and examination of its
components [40] suggests that it is an unlikely candidate to
be identified as an intervention to change benefit finding.
The intervention exposes patients to ten treatment modules
in ten sessions, most of them being relaxation therapies, but
coping skills, including assertiveness and anger manage-
ment training are also included. The original goal of CBSM
was a reduction in distress, but no such effects were
obtained. The CBSM trial is quite consistent with most
studies of early-stage and metastatic breast cancer patients
in not demonstrating a reduction in distress [48–50]. An
examination of the actual results for the time x treatment
interactions in these studies reveal few significant effects
for multiple measures of distress, and no effects if controls
for multiple comparisons are introduced [51]. The null
results of these studies might simply be due to the weakness
of group intervention or this pattern of results could be due
to the low level of distress among breast cancer patients
when they are not selected on the basis of heightened
distress [51]. Regardless, a skeptic might note that claims
that such interventions, although designed to reduce
distress, actually increase benefit finding and thereby
improve immune functioning preserves interest in them as
potentially active, effective interventions.
Yet, the evidence that these psychological interventions
yield clinically significant changes in immune functioning
in cancer patients is to date quite limited and unconvincing.
The McGregor et al. [39] study was limited in sample size
and had a lack of uncorrected intervention–control group
differences. Claims of it being a positive trial must depend
instead on multivariate analyses that violate assumptions
about requisite minimal sample size and so, are likely to
yield spurious results [52]. Andersen et al. [47] also
claimed clinically significant immune effects for an
intervention having much in common with CBSM, but
they employed a full array of measures of immune
functioning without a specific hypothesis, most of them
yielding negative effects, and it is unlikely that the
particular patterning of positive findings across measures
and time points would have been predicted. It may be
premature to conclude that interventions like CBSM are
ineffective in producing changes in immune functioning in
cancer patients. However, effects on immune functioning of
interventions identical or similar to CBSM have been
investigated more extensively with HIV/AIDS patients,
and the results are discouraging. A systematic review
revealed no effects in 15 individual trials or when results
of the trials are combined in a meta-analysis [53]. Similarly,
an earlier meta-analysis had found little capacity of the
kinds of relaxation exercises included in CBSM to affect
parameters of immune function [54] and offered a pessi-
mistic assessment of the prospects for demonstrating
clinically meaningful change:
“Each of the measures used in this literature
represents only a small facet of a complex, highly
redundant system. It would therefore be inappropri-
ate to conclude that intervention-related changes in
any specific immune parameter signal a state of
“immune enhancement” or altered susceptibility to
immune-mediated disease. The normal functioning
range for most immune measures is very broad, and
psychological interventions typically do not induce
changes of sufficient magnitude to move people
outside of these boundaries.” ([53], p. 48)
Mass media accounts and promoters of alternative
medical treatment of cancer frequently assume the impor-
tance of strengthening the immune system for fighting
cancer, but what evidence is there that parameters of
immune functioning assessed in studies of psychological
intervention are relevant? Medical interventions that affect-
ed these immune parameters would be unlikely to attract
much attention unless it could be demonstrated that such
changes were associated with slowing of progression of
cancer or improved survival. Even when parameters of the
immune system are related to tumor characteristics, the
association could simply be a result of the tumor as a
foreign body eliciting an ineffectual response from the
immune system, such that strengthening that response
would have no effect. In general, the role of the immune
system in cancer is quite complex and poorly understood,
and in some instances, tumors may even enlist the immune
system to accelerate development [55]. The role of the
immune system is different for different cancers. Although
immunologic effects of psychosocial intervention are
studied in breast cancer, it is a particularly poor candidate
for demonstrating a clinically significant effect because it is
not immunogenic [17, 55]. Furthermore, evidence for any
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stress-immune functioning-illness link is much less con-
vincing for cancer versus other diseases [56, 57].
Recently, Andersen and colleagues claim to have
demonstrated that a psychological intervention resembling
CBSM, not only improved mood and immune functioning,
but also slowed progression of early breast cancer and
increased survival [20]. Yet, a careful examination of the
data from this study gives a contrary impression. Weak,
mostly null results were obtained across eight measures of
mood, 15 measures of immune functioning, and four
measures of health behaviors. There would appear to be no
differences between the intervention and control group in
progression and survival in straightforward, simple compar-
isons [58]. Andersen et al.’s claims of an effect of
psychological intervention on survival are also markedly
inconsistent with a larger literature. A systematic review
concluded that the evidence is uniformly negative [59]. No
trial in which survival was chosen as the outcome of interest
a priori has demonstrated a survival effect for patients with
any type of cancer, when psychotherapy was not confounded
with improved medical surveillance or treatment.
A close examination of the classic Spiegel et al. trial [42]
shows that the survival curve for the control group is
aberrant, so that the study violates the basic assumptions of
a clinical trial that absent receiving the intervention, the
intervention group would resemble outcomes for the
control group [61]. Yet, there has been little acknowledge-
ment among positive psychologists of such an overall
weight of negative evidence regarding the effect of positive
psychology interventions on the physical health outcomes
of cancer patients [41]. To the contrary, with what appears
to be consistent confirmatory bias, negative evidence has
been ignored or reinterpreted to create an impression of
progress and impressive breakthroughs. What is striking in
the literature concerning a positive psychology of cancer
[40] is that the issue of whether psychological interventions
can improve survival is considered by no means settled. To
the contrary, group interventions have been reconceptual-
ized in terms of positive psychological processes being
their mechanism of action and effects are claimed for
immune function, which depend on being linked to
progression and survival for their clinical validity. In effect,
the positive psychology literature continues with efforts to
explain health effects that have not been observed, using
changes in immune function as the mediator.
Benefit Finding Interventions and Psychological
Outcomes
Although after 30 years of investigation we do not know
exactly what benefit finding represents nor when it is linked
to adaptive functioning, positive psychologists have moved
ahead to develop interventions designed to enhance benefit
finding and to encourage growth following adversity.
Lechner et al. [28] have cautioned positive psychologists
that benefit finding interventions might
“...have the potential to contribute to a ‘tyranny of
positive thinking’ [60] which could become an
unintended legacy of positive psychology. In view
of the clearly mixed findings linking [benefit finding]
and positive adaptation, we urge clinicians to respect
[benefit finding] when emerging spontaneously, while
constraining their enthusiasm for inducing [it] among
clients.” ([60], p. 638)
There is, however, no evidence that such cautions are close
to being heeded. Indeed, the literature on post-traumatic
growth, to which we now turn, indicates that, for positive
psychology, it is full speed ahead and no looking back.
Post-traumatic Growth: the Apotheosis of Positive
Psychology1
Post-traumatic growth, the notion that an individual can
experience improved relationships, increased inner strength,
and deepening spirituality from having undergone a
traumatic or life-threatening experience, has spawned
hundreds of articles over the past 15 years, including many
that have appeared in behavioral medicine and health
psychology journals, where reports of growth in the aftermath
of serious illness, most frequently cancer, have prevailed. That
positive psychology has claimed post-traumatic growth (PTG)
within its domain is irrefutable: PTG is featured on the APA
Road to Resilience website [61]; the literature in this area has
been featured in both editions of the Handbook of Positive
Psychology [62, 63]; and PTG has been linked explicitly to
positive psychology in other volumes [64]. Indeed, Linley
[65]—an important contributor to the field of positive
psychology—has referred to PTG as “the apotheosis of
positive psychology.” There can be no doubt that positive
psychology embraces the burgeoning PTG literature. We
now examine this literature to determine how well positive
psychology has lived up to its high scientific standard.
The upsurge in research on post-traumatic growth in
recent years has been hastened in large part by the
availability of scales purporting to measure growth in the
context of adversity, including serious illness [66]. These
instruments have become positive psychology’s operation-
alization of post-traumatic growth.
Although research participants readily complete measures
of PTG, an examination of scale items raises serious concerns
1 Our discussion of post-traumatic growth is based in part on Tennen
and Affleck (2008).
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as to whether people can accurately portray the growth they
claim to have experienced. Every PTG scale asks participants
to rate how much they have changed on each scale item as the
result of the crisis they faced. Thus, a respondent must: (a)
evaluate her/his current standing on the dimension described
in the item, e.g., a sense of closeness to others; (b) recall her/
his previous standing on the same dimension; (c) compare the
current and previous standings; (d) assess the degree of
change; and (e) determine how much of that change can be
attributed to the stressful encounter. Psychological science,
which purportedly guides positive psychology, tells us that
people cannot accurately generate or manipulate the informa-
tion required to faithfully report trauma- or stress-related
growth (or to report benefits) that results from threatening
encounters.
Recalling Personal Change
The psychological literature demonstrates consistently that
people are unable to recollect personal change accurately.
Costa and McCrae [67] assessed the “Big 5” personality
traits twice over 6 years. After the second assessment,
participants were asked to report changes in their person-
alities over the 6 years. Based on their findings, Costa and
McCrae concluded that “it appears that self-perceived
changes in personality are misperceptions” (p. 65). Henry
and colleagues [68], who had collected 18 years of repeated
measures of well-being and behavior from their large and
well-characterized cohort, asked participants to recall how
much they changed on the measured constructs. Retrospec-
tive reports of change showed poor agreement with
prospective data documenting actual changes. Similarly,
Robins, Noftle, Trzesniewski, and Roberts [69] measured
college students’ personality six times over 4 years. After
the Year 4 assessment, they measured perceived personality
change. Most of these students believed that their person-
ality had changed substantially in positive ways—from
their reports, we might be led to infer that they experienced
“transition-to-college-related growth.” However, the corre-
spondence between actual change measured prospectively
and perceived change was, once again, quite modest.
There is also clear evidence that people cannot recall
personal change accurately even over a few months. In a
pivotal study, Wilson and Ross [70] asked college students to
rate their social skills, self-confidence, and life satisfaction in
September and then again in November. Their September
self-ratings were somewhat more favorable than their
November ratings. But when these students were asked in
November to describe themselves as they were in September
on these same attributes, they rated their September self as
inferior to their November self. In other words, they
perceived improvement in the face of actual decline. Had
Wilson and Ross asked their participants how much they had
changed since September, they would almost surely have
found evidence of “growth” when there was none.
The measures of PTG that are the basis of positive
psychology’s contributions to the literature inquire about
positive relationship change. Fortunately, there is a well-
developed scientific literature upon which to evaluate
whether people can recall relationship change accurately.
In one of several studies of perceived growth in close
relationships, Kirkpatrick and Hazan [71] asked dating
couples to assess the current quality of their relationship
once a year for 4 years. In the fourth year, these couples
were asked about the quality of their relationship in each of
the previous years that they had participated in the study.
As a group, couples recalled that the strength of their love
had grown over time, just as participants in studies of
post-traumatic growth report that their close relationships
have deepened and grown. Yet, the prospective ratings
Kirkpatrick and Hazan had collected revealed no increases
in reported love and attachment. Kirkpatrick and Hazan’s
findings have received conceptual replication in the work of
Karney and Coombs [72, 73]. Taken together, studies of
couples’ recollections of relationship change—studies that
represent the science that positive psychology purports to
revere—present a formidable challenge for its claims
regarding post-traumatic growth.
Attributing Growth to a Traumatic Experience
Even if people were not burdened by the recall problems
documented repeatedly in studies of perceived personal
change and relationship change, to complete current
measures of PTG they would need to accurately determine
how much change can be attributed to the traumatic event
itself. In other words, people must be able to accurately
judge co-variation between the event and subsequent
personal changes. A good deal of evidence demonstrates
how judgments of co-variation are biased through illusory
correlation [74], whereby the individual who expects a
relationship between the two variables tends to overesti-
mate the magnitude of any relation that might exist or even
infers a relation when none exists.
Consider a participant in one of the many published studies
of PTG among women with breast cancer. The participant is
asked to rate the growth she experienced from the cancer
experience. To accurately convey the amount of growth that
occurred for each scale item, the respondent must first
compare herself in the present with how she recalls being on
that dimension prior to her cancer diagnosis and then estimate
how much of that difference is due to the cancer experience
rather than to a secular trend, a developmental change, or a
process unrelated to her illness. But, the psychological
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literature makes clear that people deprecate their past selves to
enhance themselves in the present, and they exaggerate in
retrospect the stressfulness of life encounters as a way to
enhance their current selves. Schacter [75] provides convinc-
ing evidence to support his conclusion that “[e]xaggerating
the difficulty of past experiences is another way people
enhance [their current status]” (p. 152).
Even among those relatively few people with near-perfect
recall and no motivational impetus, the challenge of detecting
and recalling trauma-related change, i.e., change that takes
into account developmental trajectories unrelated to any
particular event, is formidable, and positive psychology’s
measures of PTG and benefit finding are not exceptions to the
rather overwhelming evidence. Psychological science has
known for a half century [76] that people cannot combine the
complex information required to judge that personal growth
has occurred in response to a threatening encounter, and
many investigations over many years have documented the
significant limitations in people’s capacity to recall personal
change. We must conclude that positive psychology
researchers are either unaware of the rich and broad
psychological science that is at odds with their measurement
tools or that they have decided, contrary to their public
assertions, to ignore the science.
A recent study [77] has now tested directly the validity
of self-reported post-traumatic growth by assessing pro-
spectively the relation between the measurement of post-
traumatic growth as advocated by positive psychology
investigators and actual growth from pre- to post-trauma. In
this study, more than 1,500 young adults completed
measures of the post-traumatic domains measured by the
Post-traumatic Growth Inventory (PTGI) [78] on two
occasions separated by 2 months. They also completed
the PTGI on the second occasion. One hundred twenty-two
of the participants were selected for further study because
they reported experiencing a traumatic event during the
2 months. Nearly 75% of these events were rated by the
participants as causing intense fear, helplessness, or horror,
which is part of the definition of a traumatic event in the
DSM-IV [79].
Frazier and colleagues compared actual change in the PTGI
domains to scores on the PTGI among participants who
reported a traumatic event during the time between the two
assessments. PTGI scores were by and large unrelated to actual
growth in PTG-related domains. Moreover, growth measured
with the PTGI was associated with increased distress from pre-
to post-trauma, whereas actual growth was related to decreased
distress. Finally, PTGI measured growth, but not actual growth
was strongly related to positive reinterpretation coping. Based
on these findings, the authors conclude “[t]hus, the PTGI and
perhaps other retrospective measures [of PTG] do not appear to
measure actual pre- to posttrauma change” (p. 912). Most
recently, Yanez, Stanton, Hoyt, Tennen, and Lechner [80]
replicated these troubling findings and offered preliminary
evidence for their underlying mechanisms.
We are at a loss to explain why positive psychology
investigators continue to endorse the flawed conceptualization
and measurement of personal growth following adversity.
Despite Peterson’s [1] warning that the credibility of positive
psychology’s claim to science demands close attention to the
evidence, post-traumatic growth—a construct that has now
generated hundreds of articles—continues to be studied with
flawed methods and a disregard for the evidence generated
by psychological science. It is this same pattern of disregard
that has encouraged extravagant claims regarding the health
benefits of positive psychological states among individuals
living with cancer.
We want to be clear that we are not asserting that people
cannot grow from confronting life’s slings and arrows,
including serious illness and other health challenges. Of
course, positive psychology has no corner on the concept of
post-traumatic growth, which has been alluded to by
philosophers, playwrights, novelists, theologians, and more
recently, icons of the popular culture. What positive
psychology potentially has to offer the concept of post-
traumatic growth is scientific scrutiny through careful
measurement, sensitive study designs, an attitude that
propels investigators to seek facts that will disconfirm
positive psychology’s elegant hypotheses, and careful
attention to credible evidence. It is here, in the science—
which ostensibly distinguishes the current version of
positive psychology from its predecessors—that positive
psychology has failed, quite miserably we believe, in its
approach to examining growth following adversity.
Conclusion
We have challenged on scientific grounds positive psychol-
ogy’s approach to four issues that have moved front and
center in the behavioral medicine literature: Positive
psychological factors influencing the physical health of
people living with cancer and the health effects of
psychological interventions; benefit finding in the face
of serious illness and other threatening encounters; and
post-traumatic growth. In each area, positive psychology
investigators have been indifferent to the scientific evidence
and have applied study methods and designs that are—
based on strong psychological science—completely inade-
quate. This contrasts sharply with the quality of accumulating
evidence demonstrating that life stress predicts progression of
some diseases [81] even if not convincingly cancer and that
stress dysregulates the immune system and compromises
health in other ways as well [82].
Peterson [1] concluded that “positive psychology will rise
or fall on the science on which it is based (p. xxiii).” Using
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this standard, positive psychology has fallen in its treatment
of these four important areas of inquiry that are highly
relevant to Annals readers. We call on positive psychology’s
leadership, which to this point has fostered a destructive
exuberance in the four areas we have reviewed, to challenge
positive psychologists to rededicate themselves to a positive
psychology based on scientific evidence rather than wishful
thinking.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution Noncommercial License which per-
mits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any
medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
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